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I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the leading hypotheses advanced to interpret the significance
of religion in modern society is undoubtedly the hypothesis o£ secularization.

Unlike most of the journalists and theologians who have largely

taken secularization as an established fact, contemporary sociologists of
religion are by no means in agreement not only about the nature, causes,
and the future course of secularization but also about the very occurrence
of secularization itself.

Contemporary sociologists who are interested in

this topic can be roughly divided into two opposing camps.

Whereas one

camp maintains that secularization is definitely taking place as religion
is progressively becoming marginal and irrelevant--if not disappearing-both in social life and in individual consciousness, the other camp
insists that the concept of secularization is more a myth than a fact for
religion has not shown any sign of decline or demise.

What is more remark-

able is that the same sociologists may belong to one camp in one context
and switch to the opposing camp in another--that is, he may argue against
the secularization hypothesis in one discussion and talk in favor of it
in another.

Although all sociologists of religion are fully aware of the

scarcity of empirical data and the inadequacy of the data that are available, both opponents and exponents of the secularization hypothesis have
marshalled empirical materials to endorse their respective positions.
The purpose of this thesis is to trace out the source of these discrepancies in the current discussion of secularization.
~

Due to its popularity, articles, books, and conventions have been
dedicated to the thesis of secularization.
1

One can hardly find a con-

2

temporary textbook on religion without giving

~ome

attent1.,on to this top1.c . .

Yet, a contrasting analysis of contemporary perspectives on the issue of
secularization is still wanting.

Shiner~s

(1967) landmark article, nThe

Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research,

t

in which he constructed

six ideal types of the meaning of secularization, is an interdisciplinary
rather than a purely sociological study.
Codification of the Sociological Theory on

In his

master~s

thesis, "The

Secularization,~~

Tellis-

Nayak (1970) attempted to arrange some of the contemporary theories on
secularization into an individualization-rationalization framework, treating the objective, structural secularization and the subjective, individual
secularization as the subthemes of the general process of individualization and rationalization.

In the article, ' 1Les Th~ories Sociologiques

Concernant la S~cularisation-Typologie at Critique, 11 which later, with
some changes, was developed into a book, Lauwers (1973} classified some
major sociological theories on secularization into three types: pluralization (Herberg and Yinger), privatization (Berger and Luckroann), and
rationalization (Weber and Wilson).

In his book, The Sociology of

Secularization: A Critique of a Concept, Glasner (1976) took a sharp issue
with the concepts of secularization in sociological literature criticizing them as social myths rather than scientific constructs.

All these

studies tend to treat the theorists as though they all took secularization as an empirically

a~ready

verified fact and overlooked some important

distinctions they have made, implicitly and explicitly, i_n their discussion of secularization.

What distinguishes the present study from all

the previous ones is the effort to bring to light these distinctions
that qualify the arguments of the sociologists about the issue of

3

secularization.

It is argued that the current conflicting and ambiguous

views on secularization stem 1 to a very large extent, from the different
definitions of religion that contemporary sociologists of religion
employed in their discussion of secularization.
greatly in defining religion.

Sociologists differ

By the term "religion," they may refer to

a particular religious tradition, or they may mean religion in general.
Even when they speak of religion in general, some may define religion so
broadly that they include in their definition even those belief systems
that are normally considered non-religious or even anti-religious such as
Communism; others may exclude such systems in their definition of religion.
In general, if religion is defined in generic terms, sociologists adopting an exclusive definition of religion tend to defend the secularization
thesis understood as the decline of religion, whereas those preferring
an inclusive definition tend to reject it; but none of the contemporary
sociologists is willing to accept a concept of secularization that suggests
en eventual total disappearance of religion.

However, if religion is

defined in terms of a particular religious tradition, all sociologists
tend to argue for the secularization thesis, at least, when it indicates
the decline of religion; some are even in favor of a concept of secularization that refers to a complete demise of religion.
This study is divided into two major sections.

In the first section,

attempt is made to analyze how the different definitions of religion which
contemporary sociologists adopt, have affected their views on the nature,
alleged causes, and future direction of secularization.

The objective of

the second section is to point out how the different definitions of religion
."

have influenced the sociologists in their interpretation of historical,
statistical, and survey data, as well as their evaluation of the signifi-
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cance of the upsurge of the so-called new religions.
This analysis is confined, chiefly, to the views of Yinger, Bellah,
Parsons, Greeley, Glock, Berger,
Acquaviva.

O~Dea,

Luckmann, Martin, Wilson, and

These sociologists of religion are selected not just because

they have shown a sustained interest in the issue of secularization, but
especially because their positions are representative of those of the contemporary sociologists who have discussed the topic of secularization.
In the absence of a universally accepted de:l;inition o£ religion, any
critique of the different approaches to the issue of secularization must
be based on a particular definition of religion with i.ts own bias.
this analysis is intended to be descriptive rather· than criti.cal ..

Hence,

II. THEORETICAL DISCREPANCIES
With rare exceptions (Becker, 1932, 1967; Goodridge, 1968), the
notion of secularization, variously conceptualized as it i.s, is conceptualized in terms of religion.

The definition o£ religion determines,

to a very considerable degree, a sociologist '·s assessment of religion ~s
past, present, and future significance in society and, consequently, his
position on the issue of secularization.

Despite its importance, not all

sociologists concerned with the problem of secularization have put forward
a clear-cut definition of religion: some have proposed more than one,
others none.

In order to classify a sociologist\s stand in the discussion

of secularization, a typical definition of religion will be selected if he
has offered several; in case he has given none, effort will be made to
gather information from the scattered texts of his works to ascertain what
he means by religion.

This section is intended to point out the :;i.mplica-

tions of the definition of religion for a diagnosis of secularization's
occurrence, the evaluation of its alleged causes, and the predictions of
its future course.
Definitions of Religion and Conceptualization
of Secularization
Definitions of religion proposed by sociologists have been variously
classified.

Some sociologists such as Berger

(1967a:l75~178,

1971, 1974),

Luckmann (1967:41-43, 1971, 1977), Dobbelaere and Lauwers (1973) divide
them into substantive and functio.nal definitions in terms of whether
emphasis is placed on the content of religion, or on what religion does
....

for society or the individual.

Other writers like Towler (1974;15-18)

and Machaleck (1977) distinguish between real and nominal definitions
5
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depending on whether they correspond to all concrete manifestations of
religion known, or are just arbitrary constructions of the investigators
for their specific researches.

For our purpose, it seems convenient to

follow yet another group of sociologists such as Robertson (1970:35-41)
and Jackson (1974:7-13) and classify them into exclusive and inclusive
definitions.

Exclusive definitions tend to follow the tradition of Otto

and exclude what are conventionally considered not as religions, whereas
inclusive definitions are more in line with Durkheim's school and include
also what are normally regarded not as religions.

Practically, exclusive

definitions can be equated with substantive and real definitions, and
~fbile

inclusive definitions with functional and nominal ones.

sociolo-

gists committed to an exclusive definition are more likely to argue in
favor of the secularization hypothesis, those opting for an inclusive
definition tend to refuse it.
Inclusive Definitions
One group of sociologists choose to define religion so broadly that
any notion of secularization, seen as

1947:48) is virtually impossible.

~'dereligionizationu

(Robertson,

According to these sociologists,

religion does change in content and form but it never declines or demises.
The most inclusive definition of religion ever advanced by a
sociologist is probably the one proposed by Luckmann.
according to him, "that that makes a human organism a

Religion is,
human~•

(das, was den

II

Menschen zum Menschen lasst) (1972:5).

Since, empirically, it is the

world view which performs such a function, Luckmann (1967:53) calls the
world view

11

the elementary social form of religion," and as such, it is

considered as constitutive of both individual and society.
The statement that religion is present in nonspecific form in all societies and all ''·normal"

7
individuals is, therefore, axiomatic. It specifies a
religious dimension in the 'definition' of individual
and society but is empty of specific empirical content
(Luckmann, 1967:78).
Berger (1971:52) comments on Luckmann's definition of religion: "Since no
man or society can exist without religion (in Luckmann's definition), there
can be no secularization proper--there is only shift and change of religion."
Indeed, Luckmann (1969, 1971, 1977) considers the notion of secular!zation that suggests the decline of religion or the disappearance of
religion as a contemporary myth, created by those theologians, sociologists, and historians who, seeking for a systematic historical understanding of the emergence, nature, and uniqueness of modern world, employed a
substantive, narrow definition of religion, often identifying religion
tout court with its organizational and institutional forms, presumed the
existence of a golden era of religion from which religion began to deter!orate, and adopted the positivistic view of historical evolution that as
human reason develops religion automatically declines.

Because the notion

of secularization originates in the desire for a comprehensive account of
the felt uniqueness of modern world, Luckmann notes that "in a manner of
speaking, the roots of the notion of secularization are religious" (1977:
17), and such an account, "subverted by ideological oversimplifications,"
is called ''mythological" because it is "a historical narrative which contains a number of fictitious elements" (Luckmann, 1977:17).
Parsons, in his early writings (1951:326-383; 1952:283-296) emphasizes religion on personality level; but, in his later works (1964; 1966b:
28-29; 1971:207-245), he conceives religion primarily as the ultimate
value that informs the whole social order and interprets it in terms of
the cybernetic hierarchy of control.

8

. • • for many years, the general view which I have been
espousing is that, in the socio-cultural sphere, and
indeed also the psychological, what has come generally
to be called 'religion' stands at the highest level in
the cybernetic hierarchy of the forces which, in the
sense of defining the general directionality of hum~n
action among the possible alternatives pe.rmitted in the
human condition, controls the process of human action
(Parsons, 1971:215-216).
Society is seen, in keeping with the
ously based moral order

char~cterized

Durkhe~ian tr~dition,

a$

by congruence within and

a religib~tween

the

cultural, structural, and personality levels of the social system (Fenn,

1970: 117-136).

Thus, every society manifests religious. values, and every

human action is guided, directly or indirectly, by religion.

When every

social order and human action is necessarily congruent with religious
values, a secularized society or individual is no longer conceivable.
Parsons calls the concept of secularization defined as the loss of
religious commitment or the diminution of religious influence a misinterpretation (1971:217-218) and a false identification of religion with
other worldliness (1963: 36-37).
While Luckmann and Parsons focus on religion as an objectiyated
meaning or value system that regulates, controls, and transforms individuals, another group

of sociologists, inspired by Tillich, regard

religion primarily as a cultural tool invented by man to cope with ultimate problems of existence.

Thus, Yinger defines religion as

. • • a system of beliefs and practices by means. of which
a group of people struggle with these ultimate problems
of human life. It expresses their refusal to capitulate
to death, to give up in the face of frustration, to allow
hostility to tear apart their human associations (1970;7).
Bellah employs a similar definition: "religion is a set o;l; symbolic
forms and acts which relate men to the ultimate conditions of hi.s existence" (1970: 21).

Likewise, Martin sees. religion as

~'man 1 s

attempt to

9

come to a working settlement with the condition in whi.ch he finds himself"
(1965:12-13).

Though what are considered as the ultimate problems and the

ways of coping with them may change over time,. there will, according to
these sociologists, always be problems which cannot be adjusted or solved
with empirical resources and rational means, and menwill always resort to
supra-empirical means to deal with them (Yinger, 1967;20; 1970:9-12;
Bellah, 1970:203; Martin, 1969:5-6).

In other words, thecontent and form

of religion may change as perceptions of the ultimate problems change, but
without religion, man would not be human (Bellah, 1970:203).

Renee, one

should not ask whether or how much people al;'e religious, but how and how
differently people are religious (Yinger, 1970:34-35;

488-489)~

It is

obvious that for these sociologists, the idea of religious decline or
demise is logically unimaginable.
Yinger (1963:67-74) maintains that the notion of the decline of
religion is rooted in the faulty definition of religion in terms of a set
of unmodifiable beliefs and practices, which resembles Bellah's J;"emark
that the idea of secularization originates ft;"om the identification of
religion with "belief," understood as an absolutized set of propositions
(Bellah, 1970:221-222).

Furthermore, to Bellah, as to Luckmann? the idea

that as science advances, religion declines or disappears, is not a
scientific notion.but a religious one, since it functions basically to
create an emotionally coherent picture (1970:237).

The unitary, irrever-

sible understanding of secularization stems, according to Mat;"tin (1969:136), from a purist definition of religion, a unilinear view of history,
the idea of a universal convergence of culture, and an attempt to simplify
the complexity of religious change in the interest Q;i; a counter-religious
ideology.
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In addition to viewing religion as "tentative answers to the ultimate mysteries" (Greeley, 1973:175), Greeley conceives rel;i.gion as
designed to satisfy certain permanent human needs: the needs for belonging
to a group which shares his ultimate value commitment, integrating the
disturbing forces of sexuality with the rest of life, coming into contact
with the mysterious and the awesome, and finally, the need for having
certain leaders who can furnish both comfort and challenge in the wrestling with ultimate problems (1972a).

As thes.e human needs al;'e postulated

to persist, so is also the effort to find means to meet them: J:eligion.
Partly reflecting the criticisms of Luckmann and Martin, Greeley (1972a:
17-54; 1972b:l27-155) calls the conventional thesis of secularization
understood whether as religious crisis or decline a myth supported
neither by empirical data nor by sociological theories; i.t is rooted in
doctrinaire assumptions about the nature of history and social change, in
the interpretatidn of the religion of the general population in terms of
the intellectuals' attitude toward religion, and in the idea that the
present generation is the hinge of history.
Most of the current criticisms of the concept of s.ecularization
(Matthes, 1962a; 1962b:74-104; Rendtorf, 1966; Savramis, 1967; Watzke,
1969; Towler, 1974:228-251; Brothers, 1973; Dobbeleare and Lauwers, 1973;
Glasner, 1976) are either repetitions, reflections, or variants of the
positions cited above.

They are all derived, directly or indirectly,

from a broad definition of religion and a nature of man that is postulated, implicitly or explicitly, to be religious.

Little attention has

been given to the questions: Is a broad definition itsel:J; an ideology
(Berg2r, 197 4)?

Is religion universal (_Cohen, 1966)?

Do all men

actually always seek symbolic means to solve the "ultimate problems," or

11
to meet the alleged religious needs?
common values (Fenn, 1970)?
ans~-1ered,

Is society necessarily held by

Unless these questions are adequately

all the criticisms of the concept of seculax-i.zation themselves

might be just as based on doctrinaire assumptions as the concepts of
secularization they criticize.
Secularization Modified
As indicated above, all these sociologists have launched their
attacks on the notion of secularization from the

$tandpo~nt

of religion

so inclusively defined that any conceptualization of decline of religion
as such is by definition ruled out.

Yet,· some modified versions of

secularization do appear, here and there, in their works.

Such modified

concepts of secularization are no longer constructed in te;r:-ms of religion
per se, but in terms of a particular form of religion..

Thus, Yinger

(1963:67-74) maintains that the concept of secularization makes sense
only from the point of view of a specific religious tradition at a given
time.

Indeed, in his early work (1951;119) he defi.nes secularization as

"the process in which traditional religious symbols and ;forms have lost
force and appeal."

Bellah, who argues for a distinction between "religion"·

and "belief," states that "what is generally called secularization and the
decline of religion would in this context appear as the decline of the
external control system of religion and the decline of traditional
religious belief" (1970:227).

Elsewhere (Bellah, 1968:222), as an

advocate of a religious evolutionary theory, he holds that uthe process
of secularization involves a change in the structure rather the end of
religion itself."

Speaking of the Catholic Church after Vatican Il,

Greeley (1966:119-120) characterizes the t;r:-ansition from a feudal
organizational style to a modern large corporate one as secularization:

12
In becoming secular it is putting aside the stati..c,
tribal, highly symbolic, ritualistic relationship that
with some minor changes have been typical of it for half
a millenium, and it is taking on the dynamic, rationalized, flexible, and technological relationships of the
contemporary world. Just as the organization of the
Church in the middle ages reflected the styles of organization to be found in the secular society (or perhaps
vice versa) so the Catholic Church in the modexn world
can be presumed to take on the organizational style which
is characteristic of any large corporate body in the
modern world (1966:120).
Martin who so energetically called £or the eliJninati.on of the concept of secularization (1967:9-12) has himself developed a general
theory of secularization (1978), a theory, basically limited to
Christianity, but, with modification, can also be applied to other
religions (1978:1-2).

Martint.s concept of seculari.zation is no longer

understood as a universal, unilinear, and :irreversible process but contains several more or less discrete and limited trends, varying both in
direction and in degree under specific historical and cultural conditions

(1978: 2).

It could be thus called a ~'middle rangeH theory of seculariza-

tion.
Luckmann (1963:150; 1967:28-40) employed the term secularization
when he described the restricted Church participation in Europe and the
"radical inner change in American church religion'' (1967 :36}.

His early

work (1963) was based on the hypothesis that with the growth of urbanization men become less religious.

rurthermore, he also developed his own

theory of secularization that institutional segmentation has replaced
religious values with functional rationality i.n the var:i.ous institutiona! spheres such as economy and politics as he explains:
• . . Secularization is not a process in which traditional religious values just fade away; it is a
process in which internal institutional ideologies
replace, within their own domain, an over-arching and
transcendent universe of norms (1963:160).

13
Luckmann points out repeatedly that this theory refers only to the major
institutions, not to the individuals or society at large (1969:179; 1973:
78).

In other words, social structure is secularized; individual and

society are not.
Probably the most peculiar and ambiguous concept of secularization
current in the literature is the one formulated by Parsons.

Positing

society as a moral community and interpreting it in terms of cybernetic
hierarchy of control, Parsons suggests that the question of secularization should also be approached within the same framework of reference
(1971:215-216).

Since, for Parsons, as noted above, it is impossible to

conceive any sector or individual in society as being uncontrolled by
religious values, he has constructed a concept of secularization, not in
terms of the decline of religion, but in terms of the institutionalization
of religious values.

It is a process in which religion, standing at the

top of the cybernetic

hie~archy

of control and as the ultimate value and

ground of meaning, progressively reintegrates those components in society
which have, through differentiation, been separated from its influence.
This integration is made possible by according religious significance to
the secular components, which is, in turn, made possible by modifying
previous religious values.

Parsons calls the former process "adaptive

upgrading," the later "value-generalization.u

It is, therefore,

inaccurate to regard Parsons' concept of secularization just as differentiation.

It is, as he himself interprets it, basically a dual process

of differentiation and inclusion (1971:218-219).

Indeed, by viewing

secularization as the institutionalization of religious values, Parsons
has emphasized inclusion at the expense of differentiation.

In dis-

cussing inclusion, he seems to have overemphasized the moral upgrading
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of the secular and overlooked the value-generalization, which is precisely
what many authors call secularization.

Elsewhere (1965a:46), Parsons

grants that a society in which no religious institution is permitted to
set normative standards for the general population, such as in the United
States, may be defined as secularized
Thus, although these sociologists criticize the concept of secularization in one context, they use it in another.

Because of the recent dis-

cussion of the concept of secularization, it seems that some authors have
become more cautious in using it; others even drop the term completely
(Winter, 1977; Yinger: 1970 as compared with 1951).
The concept of secularization cannot be conceived unless a fixed
point of departure is established.

Religion, inclusively defined, can

have virtually all possible contents and forms and cannot be limited to a
particular form or content.

As such, it is unable to provide a starting

point from which the process of secularization can begin.

The modified

notions of secularization, cited above, are only possible because a
vantage point has been established, be it the traditional religion, a
particular denomination, or the differentiated sectors, which is exactly
what the sociologists who choose an exclusive definition of religion intend
to do.
Exclusive Definitions Another group of sociologists prefer a relatively narrow definition
of religion, one that is not so narrow as can be identified with any particular form of religion, but narrow enough to make explicit the specific
difference of religion so that the religious can be discerned from the non-

'

religious, and thus make the conceptualization of secularization, even in
terms of religion as such, possible.

These sociologists, though varying

15
greatly in their elaboration of the definition of religion, all take the
sacred, the supernatural, or their equivalents as the essential characteristic of religion.
Berger (1967a:l75-177; 1971; 1974a) has repeatedly discussed the
implications of the definition of religion for the issue of secularization.
He argues for a narrow definition of religion because the elimination of
the problem of secularization by a broad definition, as Luckmann did, is
a solution too easy to be meaningful.

Religion is, for Berger, a symbolic

cosmos constructed by man in relation to the sacred in order to provide an
ultimate shield against chaos, which continuously threatens human existence (1967a:26-28; 1971:52-53).

It is "a symbolic canopy stretched out

over the network of social institutions, giving them an appearance of
stability and rightness that they would otherwise lack (1967b:310).

Secu-

larization is, logically, conceived as the progressive shrinkage of the
sacred canopy or the gradual removal of the sacred cosmos from both
social structure and individual consciousness (1967a:l05-108; 1967b:323324; 1974a:l32).

He also defines secularization variously as the demise of

the supernatural (1969:2-34), desacralization (1971), and the decline of
the experience of transcendence (1976).
Drawing on both functional and historical perspectives, O'Dea,
though occasionally speaking of religion also in a broad sense as world
view of value orientation (1971), sees religion, basically, as man's
response to a beyond experienced as sacred when he faces the limitsituation of contingency, powerlessness, and scarcity (1966:1-35).
Religion is man's response to breaking points at
which he experiences ultimate and sacred powers. Out
of this experience religious organizations, ritual
practices, and beliefs and values evolve. Such institutionalized religious forms express the human answer

16
engendered at the breaking points while putting men into
ritual relationships with the sacred and ultimate power"
(O'Dea, 1966:27).
Despite his frequent remarks on the loss of direction or orientation in
contemporary American society (1969, 1971), O'Dea conceives secularization
mainly as a transformation of attitude and thought:
Secularization can be said to consist fundamentally
two related transformations in human thinking. There is the
''desacralization'- of the attitude toward persons and things
--the withdrawal of the kind of emotional involvement of the
sacred. Secondly, there is the rationalization of thought-the withholding of emotional participation in thinking about
the world. Rationalization implies both a cognitive attitude
relatively free of emotion, and the use of logic rather than
an emotional symbolism to organize thought (O'Dea, 1966:81).
In search for a general, elastic, and culture-free definition of
religion, Acquaviva (1971:25-67) ended up simply with "the experience of
the sacred."

While the concepts of secularization formulated by Berger

and O'Dea can, in its simplest form, labeled as desacralization, Acquaviva makes a clear distinction between secularization and descralization.

Secularization is conceived as the refusal of magical use of the

sacred, or the unwillingness to attribute magical significance to things,
events, or persons, whereas desacralization refers to the loss of capacity
of the experience of the sacred, or the decline of intensity and diffusion of the experience of the sacred (Acquaviva, 1971:66-67; Acquaviva
and Guizzardi, 1971:35-36).

This distinction makes possible the notion

of a secularized religion, i.e., the experience of the sacred without
magical manipulation of the sacred.
can still have a religion.

In other words, a secularized man

But, a desacralized religion, i.e.,

a

religion without the experience of the sacred, is, for Acquaviva, a contradition in term (1971:66).

'

Some sociologists, though formally defining religion as such in

17

terms of the more general category of the supernatural or the sacred, are
primarily concerned with the organized religions in their discussion of
secularization.

Thus, Wilson considers religious all "those activities

and orientations that make explicit reference to the supernatural source
of value" (1976b:4) or are "determined by faith in well-defined supernatural order" (1971:256).

Yet, he insists that the discussion of

secularization should focus only on the gradual disregard of those beliefs
and practices that received sustained social support and institutional
expressions (1971:252-253).

Hence, the concept of secularization advanced

by Wilson refers primarily to the shift of conventional religion from
"being central to the whole way of life" to being "no more than a leisuretime pursuit" (1971:265), a concept almost identical with the one proposed
by Luclcrnann.

His often cited definition of seculartization reads: "The

process whereby religious thinking, practice, and institutions lose social
(emphasis mine) significance (1969:14).
Similarly, Glock defines religion per se as any "value orientation
that has a supernatural referent (Glock and Stark, 1964:17), but in all
his works, he is preoccupied, as he himself attests (1967:29-30), with the
significance of Christian religions in the beliefs and practices of individual Americans.

As a result, Glock defines secularization basically in

terms of Christian beliefs variously as the process in which "a demythologized modernism is overwhelming the traditional, Christ-centered, mythical
faith (Stark and Glock, 1968:205), or in which "the mythical, the supernatural elements of traditional Christianity have been replaced by a
demythologized, ethical rather than theological religion (Glock and
Stark, 1965:116), or as the demise of the old time supernaturalism (Stark
and Glock, 1968:213) and the demise of organized faith (Stark and Glock,
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1968:216).

What Wilson and Glock consider as secularization appears to

concur with some of the modified versions of secularization mentioned
above such as those of

Yinger~

Bellah,

Martin~

and Luckmann.

secularization Modified
So far it has been shown
of religion as the

that~

supernatural~

by identifying the central category

the

sacred~

or the

like~

these

sociologists have been able, each in his own way, to develop their particular concepts of secularization, which, in theory, can lead to the
complete disappearance of religion.
definition of religion,

they

all~

However, in their elaboration of the
implicitly or explicitly, postulate a

metatheoretical constant which makes it impossible for them to conceptualize a notion of secularization that entails an inevitable demise of
religion.
Already in his early work (l967a, 1969) where he argues for the
thesis of secularization of both socio-cultural sphere and individual
consciousness, Berger states that "men are congenitally compelled to
impose a meaningful order upon reality" (1967a:22) and talks about
signals of transcendence metaphorically as rumors of angels (1969).
Later, he suggests that "perhaps the multidimensionality of religious
experience is an anthropological constant (1974a:l33), and that the
sacred, as an ontological reality, breaches into human daily life from
time to time (1974a:l29-131; 1976:9-12).
Berger, in his later

writings~

This probably explains why

no longer speaks of the secularization of

consciousness.
Unlike Berger who seems to perceive in the experience of the sacred
the intrusion of a pre-existing reality, Acquaviva considers the experience of the sacred rather as a pure psychological phenomenon (1971:273-283).
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As such, it represents a structural component of human psychology, and
it is, in its essential features, a patrimony of all human beings--at
least, understood as an expression of human biopsychic structure (1971:
66; 1973a:l0).

The experience of the sacred may eclipse but can never

vanish totally.

"For Acquaviva," remarks Guizzardi (1977:388), "the

experience of the sacred, in the sense of the radically other of R.
Otto, constitutes an anthropological constant of his thesis of the
eclipse of the sacred."
As stated above, Wilson and Glock discuss secularization primarily
in the context of Christian religion.

For both, when Christian religion

is discredited, the basic religious needs such as "psychic reassurances,
fantasy outlet, affection, supernatural benefit, and special dispensations" (Wilson, 1971:268), and "the need for a system of ultimate meaning" (Glock and Stark, 1965:306) are still to be satisfied.

This is the

reason why Glock speaks of "the gap of meaning" created by science that
is yet to be filled {1976:366), and Wilson talks about the "anomaly of
secularization" (1976a:76).

He observes that secularization, by des-

troying community, affection, and irrationality, makes religion appear
obsolete; yet, man remains partially irrational and cannot live without
community and affection, implying that man still needs religion.
The preceding analysis of the definitions of religion proposed by
the leading contemporary sociologists of religion has shown that none
of them can be called an exponent of the thesis of secularization without qualification.

Sociologists who work with an inclusive definition

of religion, though they attack the concept of secularization, do use the
term secularization in a particular context; some of them have even
developed their own theories of secularization.

On the other hand, those
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sociologists who adopt an exclusive def:,i.nition of religion, while
arguing in favor of the hypothesis of secularization, do not speak of
the complete demise of religion.

Thus, none of the concepts of seculari-

zation put forward by the leading sociologists of religion can be identified with the conventional idea of secularization which connotes the
eventual end of religion.
Causes of Secularization
Whether a sociologist considers a factor as a cause of secularization depends, first of all, on whether he is convinced that there is
such a process called secularization.

As indicated above, despite the

modifications they made in the discussion of the conceptualization of
secularization, sociologists committed to an inclusive definition of
religion tend to reject the hypothesis of secularization, while those
working with an exclusive definition are prone to defend it.

The aim of

this section is to clarify their respective positions on the alleged
causes of secularization.

In sociological literature, a variety of

factors have been suggested as the causes of secularization, such as the
Judea-Christian concept of God and nature, Greek reationality, humanism,
science, education, industrialization, urbanization, mobility, differentiation, and many others.

Two--by far the most extensively discussed

factors--are undoubtedly science and differentiation; the others, though
often referred to, have seldom been subject of dispute.

In the follow-

ing analysis, attention will be given exclusively to science and differentiation.

Needless to say, not all the sociologists selected in this

study have equally participated in the discussion of both subjects.
Science

"'

The popularity of the question whether the advance of science neces-
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sarily leads to the decline or the eventual death of religion has stimulated, among contemporary sociologists of religion, not so much a debate
as a variety of comments.

Unlike their early counterparts, contemporary

sociologists of religion are fully aware both of the intrinsic limitation of the scientific outlook--and hence of its restricted impact on
religion--as well as the significance of religion for human existence.
Again, how they assess the relationships between science and religion
hinges very much on their definitions of religion.
For the sociologists who are in favor of an inclusive definition
of religion, the growth of science does not weaken or demolish religion
as such, although it may destroy a certain kind of religion.

Thus,

Yinger points out that "science disapproves specific religious beliefs,
but it does not disprove religionn (1970:61).

A particular religion may

be destroyed because its beliefs and practices are incompatible with
science; or its leaders, for various reasons, prevent the necessary
adjustment.

If, however, the existing religions of a society are

rendered obsolete, new ones are bound to appear because, to Yinger, no
society can survive without providing means for its members to cope with
the ultimate problems (Yinger, 1970:61-62).

He states:

Religion in a scientific era will speak in a different
idiom, it will develop new systems of ··overbeliefs' by
means.~ of \vhich men struggle with the basic problems of
life. But it is no more true to say that science destroys
religion than it is to say that science destroys art.
When new media of communication, new materials, new
instruments are invented, science sets new conditions
within which artistic life is carried on; it modifies the
forms of expression; but it does not destroy the expressive and creative process .
• • . Of this we can be certain: by the growth of
knowledge, religion will be changed, yet it will not be ~
destroyed (1963:182-183).
vfuile Yinger focuses on the necessary adjustment of religion to the
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new environment created by science, Parsons emphasizes the absence of
theoretical clash between science and religion as such.

Religion is

concerned basically with the problem of meaning, the moral aspect of
action, and the emotional adjustment to irrational discrepancies of
existence, whereas science is interested only in empirically verifiable
knowledge (1951:326-383).

Bellah (1970:242-248) carries Parsons' argu-

ment further that not only science and religion do not have to conflict
with each other, but they can also be integrated:
When I speak of integration I do not mean some kind of
fantastic syncreticism of science and religion. They have
different purposes, different limitations, different modes
of action. But they are both part, and I would argue a
necssary part, of every culture and every person. They need
to exist in some vital and healthy whole in which each is
integral. This means not simply a tacit agreement to ignore
each other but open interchange between them with all the
possibilities of mutual growth and transformation that·.
entails (1970:244)
Greeley (1972a:l5) argues along the same line that science cannot be
regarded as a substitute of man's mythological need but as its supplement.
He also points out that it is true that science has removed many mysteries
of the world but it has, at the same time, also discovered many new ones,
which need no less ultimate, thus religious, interpretation than in the
previous eras of human history (1972a:55-83).

Indeed, "as long as rational

science cannot cope with the basic questions religion is designed to cope
with, this !the scientific achievement] is of itself essentially a trivial,
at least, as far as religion is concerned" (1972a:l4).
Martin (1969:116) observes that even though science has increased
the general sense of human power, each particular person still feels the
threat of contingency and thus the need for religion.

He

think~

that

"maybe the lack of individual power contributes to the massive survival of
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beliefs in fate, in luck, in a moral homeostasis and in superstitions of
every kind" (1969:117).

He remarks further that scientifically sophisti-

cated societies such as America "are capable of living by belief systems
emotionally and intellectually crass to the point of nausea" (1967:114).
Reflecting Bellah's idea, Martin notes that "there remains in man a
perennial urge to fit the scientific achievement (and the scientific
threat) into a framework of over-all religious meaning such as vulgarized
Marxism provides

in communist countries" (1967:115).

Luckmann seems to criticize the idea that science will necessarily
demolish religion from the standpoint of sociology of religion.

He

regards science and religion as but two among many socially constructed
symbolic universes (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:40).

As such, there is no

empirical basis to decide that one is better than the other. This is propably
why Luckmann, speaking of science and church-oriented religion, remarks
that it is "sociologically downright naive" to believe that the various
types of faith in science is inherently superior than the church religion
and one will necessarily retreat as the other advances (1967:38).
These sociologists, critical of the concept of secularization, tend
to discuss the impact of science on religion in terms of religion tout
court, taking for granted, or paying little attention to its effect on
particular religious systems.

Science, according to these sociologists

of religion, does not cause religious decline, let alone religious demise,
be it because science cannot eliminate man's ultimate concerns, or
because science and religion are not incompatible, or because science's
deadly impact on religion is not generally felt, or, finally, because
science is not superior than religion.

Thus, as long as man lives, there

will, according to these sociologists, always be religion in one form or
another ..
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For the sociologists who take the sacred or the supernatural as the
central variable of religion, science, as the epitome of the process of
rational disenchanted endeavor, does constitute a contributing factor to
religion's decline, if not its demise.
O'Dea (1956; 1966:85-86; 1969:103-109; 1971) sees science's threat
to religion essentially in its problem-solving mentality which tends to
claim to be able to solve any problem, though it is intrinsically incapable
of answering the most fundamental problems of meaning.

"It tends to dis-

solve the basic notions of religious thought as myth in the pejorative
sense of the word."

(1969:108-109)

Elsewhere, he states that science

introduces a reductionist frame of mind that tends "to make religion itself
appear a strange phenomenon and one demanding rational explanation: (1971:
328).

Thus, according to O'Dea, science, being anti-religious in its basic

orientation, has created a severe religious crisis; but, being unable to
eliminate the fundamental religious needs, it cannot destroy religion.
Wilson holds that science per se

cannot represent a rival to

religion because science is concerned with means, and religion with end
(1969:78), but the real danger of science to religion is its growing
prestige as an institution that has created a mentality that what cannot be scientifically accepted cannot be religiously reassuring (1969:18),
and "science is more reliable and more valuable than religion" (1969:67).
According to Acquaviva (1960:221; 1971:217-219), science does cause
secularization.

Science, he maintains, has transformed our logic as

evidenced in the transformation of our language.

A-religious terms have

gradualy replaced religious ones, an indication that a-religious thinking
....

has also replaced religious thinking.

Indeed, science has changed our
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standard o:f judgment.

Att~pt

a,t adjul:ltment made by

~eligion p~acti.cally

led always to secularization.
Our logic is thus. l)larked by concepts deJ;""iyed fJ;""OI!l the
recent technological and scienti:Uc reyolut:i,.on. At thi_s
point, when the paJ;""ameters of judgment o;f nea;rly 9,ll men
have been substantia,lly changed, a negative interpJ;""etation
of religious phenomena becomes ~asier. ~t is not. the caf?e
that the majority finds itself deprived of paJ;""~eters of
judgment which are sens;itive to religious phenomena~ once
these parameters have been eliminated frQlll~odern logic?
Naturally, all this leads to a religious lag in relat:i..on
to science. Efforts at ass:bllilat:i.on-,..·rarely successful~..-.
in practice lead to secularization of the sacred rather
than to assimilation by science and technology of
religious elements (1960:221}.
Li.ke Luckmann, Berger (Berger and Luckmann, 19.67; 40} believes that
the scientific world view is no better than any other world yiew; hence,
the real cause of seculari.zation should not be sought in scientific
thought, but in everyday experience:
The causes of secularization must be sought, primarily,
not in movements of ideas (such as the influence of modern
scientific thought) but in concrete social experiences.
Thus a prime secularizing force is not the abstract rationality of science or philosophy, but the 'functional rationality' (a Weberian term) of modern capitalism bureaucracy,
and industrial production. The social formations of
modernity bring about habits and mind-sets which are
unfavorable to the religious attitude. They encourage
activism, problem-solving, this worldliness, and by the same
token they discourage contemplation, surrender, and a
concern for what may lie beyond this world. But simply,
modernity produces an awful lot of noise, which makes it
difficult to listen to the gods (1976;11}.
Preoccupied with Christian religion in America, Glock, in his discussion of secularization, shows little interest in the relationship of
science and religion as such.

Glock (1972, 1976; Glock and Stark, 1965:

289-306) does acknowledge that science cannot prove or disprove the
'<

existence of the supernatural, but he perceives an irresolvable conflict
between scientific and Judea-Christian assumptions about nature and man.
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While the basic assumption of science is that every event or human action
is determined by antecedent factors, the fundamental belief of JudeaChristian religion is that God intervenes in natural events, and that
roan is essentially free in his actions.

Although science does not

eliminate religion, because the existence of nature, universe, and mankind remain unexplained, hence there will always be a warrant for the
supernatural, it does affect the "saliency of religion'' by having proved
that human behavior, including religious practice and commitment, are, in
a large measure, a result of his social context.

With the progress of

science, God may then appear iess and less relevant to everyday life.
If what can be attributed to God's will is made
narrower and narrower, and if man's accountability for his
actions is found to be more and more circumscribed, religion
seems destined to lose much of its power to inform and guide
the human condition (Glock and Stark, 1965:306).
As expected, the foregoing analysis has shown that the leading
sociologists of religion do not hold that science will ever be able to
demolish religion. · While the sociologists taking an inclusive approach
to the definition of religion believe that the advance of science cannot cause either decline nor end of religion, the sociologists taking an
exclusive approach argue that, as science progresses, religion looses in
relevancy.
Differentiation
The discussion of differentiation as an alleged contributing factor
of secularization centers on the question whether functional differentiation causes reduction or even loss of religious influence as an overarching legitirozation system.

All sociologists of religion agree that

...

differentiation does not eliminate religion on personality level, but
they disagree on the role of religion on institutional and societal levels.
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Parsons maintains that functional differentiation does not undermine
religion as an over-arching legitimzation system, but-only causes its
values to be generalized to higher levels.

As indicated above, Parsons

sees religion primarily as the ultimate value that stands on the highest
level in the cybernetic hierarchy of control, defining, in universal
terms, the patterns of desirable orientation for the entire society.
Analytically, he believes that religion as value, is uindependent of the
internal differentiation of the system" and is "relevant on the level of
generality which 'transcends' functional differentiation" (1965a:43-78).
When functional differentiation takes place, what is concomitantly differentiated is, according to Parsons, norm which specifies concrete functional performances, not value.
but it cannot be differentiated.

Value can be modified and generalized
Norm is "function-specificn (1965a:43)

and legitimated by value; it operates on "lower level of generality with
respect to expected concrete collective and role performance" (1965a"43),
while value is "independent of the specification of situation or of
differentiated function within the system" (1965a:44).

For example, in

the modern United States, the process in which religion, government,
education, economy and other major institutions have become differentiated
and specialized, has coincided with the development of a more generalized
religious orientation, which is distinct from any particular denominational tradition.

Although religious institutions are no longer allowed

to claim universal religious jurisdiction over the whole society, the
common, societal values are still values that are derived from Christian
religion.

Parsons urges that distinction should be made "between a

generally legitimate religious orientation and the particularities of a
specific denominational position" (1965b:25).

The process of differen-
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tiation is accompanied by the process of value-genera,liza,tic;m, which, as a
modification of value, ha,a been called

secula~ization

1976:35).

(Gla,sne~,

But, for Parsons, value-generalization i.s concomitant -with the incluE;ion
and the upgrading of the aecular.

I.t is the religious upgra,ding o:f; the

secular which, as stated above, should be emphasized in the discussion of
secula~ization

according to Parsons., not the

value-gene~a,liza,tion..

Parsons calls the whole di:J;ferentiation-value generalization
inclusion process

secula~ization

(1971: 218-219) t

be said to be the antecedent condition o:t;

lf

upg~ading-

diffe~entiation

theupg~ading p~ocess,

ca,n s.till
the insti-

tutionalization of religious values.
Luckmann, for whom both individua,l and society are axioma,tically
religious, does mainta.in that
tional rationality in all

diffe~entiation

majo~

replacea

~eligion

with func-

dominant institutions. such a,s politics,

economy, education, etc., as discussed

ea~lier.

He states:

They {dominant institutions] lose their intimate relation
to the transcendent symbolic universe. The traditiona,l legitimation from 'above'· (the ethic of vacation, divine ~ight of
kinds) is replaced by legitimation from '-within •, i._e.,_, by
refe~ence to the sheer rati.onal efficiency of the institution.
I.n this sense the norms o:t; the autonomous institutional spheres
are becoming increasingly 'secular' (1963;160).
As an energetic critic of Parsons' view, Fenn (1970, 1972, 1973) carries
Luckmann' s argument further by saying tha,t "differentia,ted s.ociety undermines the possibility of a single normative order, let alone a roora,l consensus which is explicitly religious in content (1973:345}. ..
ln evaluating the theoretical positions of Parsons and Luckmann,
Greeley remarks:
The question is, to a very considerable extent, one
of fact, and the data are not available for us to judge
the fact. My hunch is that the truth probably lies somewhere in between the two positions, leaning more heavily
toward Parsons than toward Luckmann (1969:85).
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Thus, sociologists advocating for an inclusive definition of religion
do not agree whether functional differentiation drives away religious
influence from non-religious institutions.

While Luckmann believes that

functional rationality completely undermines religious legitimation in
major non-religious spheres, for Parsons, functional norms are still
legitimated by religious values.
Sociologists who are in favor of an exclusive definition of religion
tend to agree with Luckmann's position.

Thus, Wilson (1976a, 1976b)

insists that modern differentiated societies have shifted from being moral
orders to being technical ones:
Modern societies have ceased to depend upon an integrated
consensus of values as the basis of their cohesion. Society,
as distinct from the agglomeration of connnunities that in the
past made up the larger entity loosely referred to as ~society~,
is a coherent, large-scale integrated system, held together by
techniques and procedures not by values. Culture, in advanced
societies, ceases to be integrative: it becomes a supernumerary
item, as society shifts from being a moral to being a technical
system (1976b:ll3).
Indeed, "modern social organization implies secularity" (1976a:259), and
the cannons of rationality that organize modern institutions are offensive
to the spirit of religion which emphasizes love, affection, and other nonrational concerns (1976a:273).
Berger points out that "the concentration of religious activities
and symbols in one institutional sphere . • • , ipso facto defines the rest
of society as 'the world', as a profane realm at least relatively removed
from the jurisdiction of the sacred'' (1967 :123).

Elsewhere he remarks:

Religion fulfills the function of symbolic integration _
by supplying values and cognitive interpretations that form
a sort of overarching canopy for all of the institutions
This function is radically transformed as modern society
emerges. Religion becomes less and less capable of furnishing
overarching symbols for the full range of social institutions
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• • . this change of functionality is a logical consequence
of the immense institutional differentiation of modern
society. The old religious symbols can no longer be made
to stretch, so to speak, to encompass the new range of institutions. Different institutional areas develop their own
autonomous symbolisms, most of them having little or no
relationship to the traditional religious ones (1967b:324).
Hence, in one place, he defines secularization as "the process by which
sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious
institutions and symbols" (1967a:l07).
Although O'Dea did not deal with the process of differentiation
theoretically, he did maintain that the emergence·of government, law, education, economy, and other major social institutions ha$ contributed to
the process of secularization of culture in which

a non-religious

world

view has crowded the religious one into the sphere of private experience
and has become the mode of thought in the public sphere, which is nothing
but another way of stating Luckmann's theory of secularization (1966:8090; 1969:42-120).
In his discussion of religion's integrative power in modern differentiated society, Glock (1960) directly addresses himself to the question
of the definition of religion: "

if we define religion as a 'sacred'

or ultimate commitment to some set of norms, values, and beliefs, then
religion is indeed essential to social

integration~t

(1960: 57); but, he goes

on to say that "institutionalized religion is not essential to social
integration; theoretically, a high degree of social integration may exist
without it" (1960: 57).

He believes tha.t institutionalized religion can

integrate society only if the supra-social authority is granted precedence
over other forms of authority; if supra-social, social, and legal authority
.....

support the same values; i f the society in question is ruled by tradition;
and i f consensus exists in the religious community (1960: 58).

In modern
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societies, he says, "this capacity of religion to inform the secular
normative structure seems to be largely a thing of the pas.t'l. (1960:59),
and organized religion does no longer inform the secular but is informed
by it (1960:59-60).
Thus, sociologists who choose to define as religion any consensus or
common value tend to reject the contention that differentiation is a cause
of secularization, while those who adopt a narrow definition of religion
agree that differentiation does remove religious influence from the major
institutional sectors.

However, whether differentiation is a cause of

secularization or not, sociological researches have :f;ound and continue to
find "the religious factor'' in various major institutional spheres as
evidenced in many textbooks of sociology of religion •.
The Future Course of Secularization
Predicting the future fate of religion is a dif:f;icult task and can
often cause embarrassment.

Speaking of the past predictions of the

religious demise, Greeley remarks that ,. the prediction has generally been
wrong every time it has been made'·' (1969: 6).

Similar statements can be

made about the predictions of a brighter future of religion.

Lenski's

anticipation of "the rising rates of church attendance in American society"
and "the strengthening of socio-religious group communalism" (1961:325) is
but a recent example.

Yet, in interpreting religion's past and present

situations, sociologists of religion are often tempted to make some projections about its future development.
How a sociologist foresees the future trend of secularization depends
obviously upon how he evaluates the alleged causes of secularization, which
is, in turn, related to the definition of religion.

The purpose of this

section is to attempt to point out the discrepancies among the leading
sociologists of religion in projecting the future direction of secularization.
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The sociologists working with an inclusive definition tend to predict
that there will be religion as it has always been, though a particular
form of religion may disappear.
According to Yinger (1970:532-534; 1971:29), since the modern world
is "desupernaturalized," existing traditional religions will unlikely play
a vital part in man's religious life in the future; instead, partly from
the sectarian protest against the established religion partly from religious innovations, and partly from the synthesis of some of quasi-religions
such as Communism, Freudianism, Positivism, and many others there will
develop new religions.

"Or they will fail to come, the world will be

shattered" (1970:533).
While acknowledging that even in the most advanced society, primitive,
archai:c, and all kinds of imaginable religions will coexist, Bellah (1968)
believes that the dominant type of religion in the post-dualistic society
will be the ''personalist and individualist but not asocial and apolitical"
(1968:227).

With increasing education, he explains, man no longer accepts

blindly any religion handed down from the past, but seeks to work out his
own ultimate problems by himself.

But, this does not mean that such a

religion will, as Luckmann (1967:117) fears, be selfish; instead, it will
be politically involved and socially conscious.
Conceiving the past socio-religious development as a differentiationvalue-generalization-upgrading-inclusion process, Parsons (1963, 1966a,
1971, 1974) does not see why the same process should stop in the future.
Rather, he perceives that a world society informed by Christian value is
in the making.

In the lVest, he notes, what, from the religious point of

view, has for nearly two centuries been defined as the most subversive
movement, namely materalistic rationalism, now seems to be in the course to
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be included within Christian value sustem (1971:231); and worldwide, for
the first time in history, Christianity is now involved in a deep confrontation with the major religions in the Orient as well as the modern
political religion of communism, and, through the upgrading-inclusion
process, Christianity will, he envisions, eventually bring the whole
world into its fold.
Martin (1976a) observes that modern societies, capitalistic as well
as Marxist, cannot manage without religion.

Both technical rationalism

and political materialism have been unable to solve personal existential
problems, and thus, he predicts that, in the future, religion will survive,
not only in the West, but also in the East.

Speaking of the world's "high

religions," Martin (1969:5-6) believes that the basic religious orientations in the world, limited in number, will always remain as fundamental
alternatives; they will not be "eroded as rationality disenchants the
world but remain as the permanent structure of options" (1969:6).
For Greeley (1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1974), there will be no
drastic religious change in the future.
(1972a).

Man is by nature "unsecular"

Contrary to Bellah and Luckmann, he does not foresee that insti-

tutional religion will lose members or importance, nor will the doctrinal
orthodoxy collapse, although they will probably change in emphasis such as
more concern with the democratic religious organization, the non-rational,
religious responsibility of the individual, intimate fellowship congregation, and more explicit articulation of religious myths (1969:16-75;
1972a:263).

"To talk about 'institutionaless' religion is," he says, "at

best naive romanticism" (1972a: 241).
Having developed the thesis that functional differentiation has displaced religion from its role as a major public institution into a
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voluntary association in the private sphere, Luckmann, in his speculation
about the future of religion, is understandably interested in the possibility of the re-emergence of religion as an overarching symbolic universe
such as it was in the middle ages or archaic societies (1971, 1972).

He

believe that the supernatural religion will not disappear, the traditional
religion will persist, and "the death of God" talk is nonsense; but he
does not think that an overarching religious system will ever be possible
again, because the functional autonomy of the major social institutions
will preclude the re-emergence of such a religion; besides, in modern
societies religion is no longer part of the general socialization.

Thus,

in highly differentiated societies religion has to take a private form and
remain invisible, so to speak.
Sociologists who prefer an exclusive definition of religion are more
cautious and less optimistic about the future development of religion,
although none of them foresees the end of religion.

In his early works

(1967a, 1969), Berger insisted that the process of secularization is
unlikely to reverse itself in the future, but, in his later writings
(1971, 1974, 1974b, 1976), he has modified his position, even though he
still maintains that the hypothesis of secularization as an interpretative scheme is valid for explaining the past and present religious situations (1971:66-67).

In a recent work he talks about his position on the

future of religion as follows:
In the last few years I have come to believe that many
observers of the religious scene (I among them) have overestimated both the degree and the irreversibility of secularization. There are a number of indications, to paraphrase Mark Twain, that the news about the demise of
religion has been exaggerated. Also, there are signs of ~
a vigorous resurgence of religion in quarters where one
would have least expected it (as, for instance, among the
college-age children of the most orthodox secularists).
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All this needs not mean that we are on a brink of a new
Reformation (though I doubt if anyone thought they were on
the brink of a Reformation at the beginning of the sixteenth century either), but it seems increasingly likely
to me that there are limits to secularization. I am not
saying this because of any philosophical or theological
beliefs about the truth of the religious view of reality,
although I myself believe in this truth. Rather, I am
impressed by the intrinsic inability of secularized world
views to answer the deeper questions of the human condition,
questions of whence, whether, and why. These seem to be
ineradicable and they are answered only in the most banal
ways by the ersatz religions of secularicism. Perhaps,
finally, the reversibility of the process of secularization
is probable because of the pervasive boredom of a world
without gods.
This does not necessarily mean, however, that a return
to religion would also mean a return to the churches. It
is perfectly possible that future religious resurgences
will create new institutional forms and that the existing
institutions will be left behind as museum pieces of a
bygone era (1974b:l4-15).
In evaluatingthe present religious stiutation in the West, O'Dea
(1968, 1969, 1971) consistently speaks of religious crisis, urges religious
leaders to adjust religion to the changing socio-cultural environments, and
is rather pessimistic about the future of religion.

However, in a book on

religion in general (Comstock, et al., 1971) of which O'Dea is a co-author,
we find a less gloomy prognosis about the future fate of religion:
The evidence at the moment is mixed. Some forms of
religion are declining; others flourishing to a remarkable
degree. In this connection we must be careful to distinguish between the continued vitality of personal religion
--an individual's religious orientation--and the decline of
importance of the institutional forms of religion. It is
true that at the present time some institutional forms of
religion have experienced a period of decline, but even this
fact must be qualified: Some Eastern religions have acquired
new vitality with the emergence of modern nationaiistic
attitudes. Furthermore, all institutions have their periods
of growth and decline, which often take a cycle pattern. A
decline at the moment may well be countered by a resurgence
in the future.
Even if it is true, however, that religion is declining
in its institutional form, we must recognize that the future
of religious activity in the life of man and the future of
religious institutions are two distinct things. It is possible
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that in a future ·world in \vhich religious institutions have little
influence on the political, economic and scientific activities of
man, large numbers of men might still pursue forms of religious
practic and symbolism that are less structured and socially
coerced than has been the case in the past (Comstock, et al., 1971:
626).
Like other sociologists of religion, Acquaviva (1968; 1971:251-306;
1973b) does not foresee the complete disappearance of religion as such in
the post-industrial society, but he is more pessimistic in assessing the
future trend of the present secularization process.

As indicated above, for

Acquaviva, the secularized man ceases to use religion magically but does not
cease to have the experience of the sacred.

Thus, in the secularized,

post-industrial society man will still have religion even though he will
have a different experience of the sacred and a different "image of God"
from what he has today (1968; 1971:283-300; 1973b; Acquaviva and Guizzardi,
1971:40-44).

In other words, there will be a new, secularized religion.

But, when he comments on the future trend of the present secularization
process in the West, he insists that secularization, as a concomitant of
the essential development of industrial society, is hardly going to stqp in
the future.
Anyhow, it appears evident that there is a process of secularization and a vast impoverishment of the sacred and religiosity;
according to the present state of research and the facts we have,
it is difficult to say when it is going to terminate. The data in
our possession make one think that there will hardly be, in the
near, even relatively remote, future, a substantial reversal of
the present trend (1971:306).
Speculating about the future destiny of religion in America, Glock
(Stark and Glock, 1968) does not predict the end of religion as such but
he believes that traditional Christian religion is on its way out and we
may well be entering a post-Christian era.
with Stark we read the following:

In a book he wrote together
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The evidence leads us to two conclusions: the religious
beliefs which have been the bedrocks of Christian faith for
nearly two millennia are on their way out; this may very
well be the dawn of a post-Christian era (Stark and Glock,
1968:205)
But later, we find a more cautious comment:
This is hardly to suggest that religion itself will die.
Clearly, so long as questions of ultimate meaning persist,
and so long as the human spirit strives to transcend itself, .
the religious quest will remain alive. But whether or not
the religion of the future is in any sense Christian remains
to be seen. Clearly, it will not be if one means by Christian
the orthodoxy of the past and the institutional structures
built upon that theology. But if one can conceive of
christianity as a continuity in a search for ethics, and a
retention of certain ~raditions of language and ritual,
perhaps Christianity will remain alive.
The institutional shape of the religion of the future
is as difficult to predict as its theological content.
Conceivably it may take on a public character, as suggested
recently by Robert Bellah, or the invisible form anticipated
by Thomas Luckmann. Or it may live on in a public witness
conducted by priests without parishes similar to religions
in Asia. Quite possibly, religion in the future will be
very different from anything we can now anticipate (Stark
and Glock, 1968:223-224).
In his assessment of the future fate of Christianity, Wilson indicates
that secular society no longer has direct respect for Christian religion,
but it is too early to say that it could function without it as its values
and orientations have been derived from the Christian past (1969:261).
Nevertheless, he says, traditional Christian religion is incapable of
expressing and accommodating man's ultimate concerns today, and new religions may be expected to emerge to take its place.

Since modern social

structure, being rationally and technically organized, cannot tolerate
religion in its public sphere of operation, new religions virtually have
to develop in the private sphere where "private individuals may experience their religious dispositions, gratifying their interests in the supernatural and work out dependency relations that are unsustained in the rest
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of their social experience (Wilson, 1971:268).
Thus, contemporary sociologists of religion, whether committed to
an exclusive or an inclusive definition of religion, are all in agreement
that religion as such will not disappear in the future.

While some are

less favorably disposed toward the fate of institutional religion, others
are more cautious in their predictions.

In different degree, all leading

contemporary sociologists of religion do not envision a very bright future
for all the existing traditional religions.
Summary
This section has been an attempt to point out the impact of the
definitions of religion as proposed by the leading contemporary sociologists
of religion on their interpretation of the nature, causes, and future course
of secularization.

It has been shown that sociologists working with an

inclusive definition of religion hold that there cannot be such a concept
of secularization seen as the decline or demise of religion per se,
although they do use the term secularization to describe changes of a
particular form of religion, notably Christianity, or the removal of
religious influence from certain institutional sectors of society.

This

is the reason why the conventional notion of secularization that suggests
the eventual end of religion has been variously labelled as myth, dogma,
ideology, or the like.

Sociologists adopting an exclusive definition of

religion do maintain that secularization is taking place even if it is
understood as the decline of religion tout court, although none of them
entertains a concept of secularization that suggests the total disappearance of religion.
Because of these divergencies of view on the conceptualization of
secularization, the leading

contemporary sociologists of religion differ
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also in their assessment of the many factors that have been cited as the
causes of secularization.

Sociologists opting for an inclusive definition

of religion tend to deny that there is any factor which can justly be
called a cause of secularization per se simply because, according to these
sociologists, secularization per se does not exist, although they do
acknolwedge that many factors have contributed to the decline or fall of
many particular religious traditions.

Sociologists using an exclusive

definition of religion do maintain that factors such as science and differentiation have caused the decline of even religion as such, if not its
demise.
As to the future direction of secularization, sociologists adopting
an inclusive definition tend to insist that religion will change and
persist as it did always in the past, while sociologists choosing an
exclusive definition are not in agreement.

Some have already perceived a

beginning of the reversal of secularization, others believe that the
religious crisis and secularization will continue indefinitely.

But they

all concur that religion as such will never vanish.
Just as the leading contemporary sociologists of religion do not
agree on the meaning of secularization they differ in interpreting the
significance and meaning of empirical materials pertinent to the issue of
secularization, to which we turn in the next chapter.

III, EMPIRICAL DIVERGENCES
The previous section has been an qttel!lpt to clarify exclusively
conceptual differences among the leading

conte~porary

sociologists of

religion in the discussion of the issue of secularization.
shown that the conflicting

vi~ws

nature~

on the occurrence,

future course of secularization are, to a large

extent~

lt has b.een
extent, and

the logical

consequences of their respective definitional preferences.

The objectsociolo~

ive of this section is to point out how the leading contemporary

gists of religion employ empirical data--understood in a broad sense of
the term--to support, or to illustrate their claims and
with regard to the hypothesis of secularization.

counter-cla~s

It focuses chiefly on

the following three questions; How do they interpret historical data to
back up their position?

Do statistical materials and research data support

the secularization hypothesis?

And, does the emergence of the so-called

new religions represent a counter-secularization trend?

It is argued that

the sociologists advocating an inclusive definition of religion tend to
deny that the empirical data available support the secularization hypothesis,
while the sociologists adopting an exclusive definition are more likely to
argue that the empirical data do support it.
Historical Data
The very concept of secularization implies the assumption that
society and individuals in previous ages were more "religious" than they are
today.

.

Are there historical data to substantiate this assumption?
'

The aim

of this section is to analyze how the leading contemporary sociologists of
religion approach this question.
40
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For sociologists working with an inclusive definition of religion,
the question whether people or society in the past were more "religious"
than they are today would be meaningless, and to ask for historical
evidence would be superfluous.

As indicated above, for these sociologists

religion is part of human condition, and society has a religious dimension;
religion changes but does not decline.
Yinger suggests that questions asking who is religious and who is
not, how far secularization has proceeded, whether there is a return to
religion, be set aside (1970:33); he even states that they are wrongly
put (1970:488-489).

For him, the history of Christianity in the western

world is not a consistent decline, but a continuous adaptation, both in
form and in content, to the changing experiences, values, and problems of
its adherents (1970:482-507).

In the course of history people have

become differently Christian not less Christian.

Parsons characterizes

the history of the West as a history of the progressive institutionalization of religious values, not the decline of religion (1963, 1971, 1974).
The medieval synthesis, the Reformation, the emergence of denominationalism,
and the new "expressive revolution" are seen as different phases in the process of institutionalization of Christian values in society, not as various
indications of a falling away from Christian commitment.
For Bellah, religion evolves but does not decline (1970:20-50).

As

he interprets it, Western religion has evolved through primitive, archaic,
historical, early modern, and modern stages.
new, but not a diluted form of religion.

Each stage has created a

Religious symbolism has evolved

from concern with the maintenance of personal, social, and cosmic harmony
in the primitive and archaic religions, through the preoccupation with
escape into the transcendental world in the historical religions, to an
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active structuring of the world according to religious values in premodern and modern times.

This process of evolution is viewed as religious

change, not secularization.

Even the collapse of traditional doctrinal

orthodoxy in modern world in not considered as a sign of secularization or
religious indifference but as a result of the emergence of a new way of
conceiving and practicing religion.

Similarly, to

Luckman~,

the history

of mankind has been marked by a series of social forms of religion, not by
a steady decline of religion (1971, 1972).

In archaic societies religion

took a diffuse form, in traditional civilizations, an institutional form,
and in modern societies, an invisible form.
Martin argues that there is no unitary process of secularization.
Religious institutions expand and decline for a variety of reasons, and
even the same religious institution falls and rises for different reasons
in different cultural and historical context (1969:14-17).

The conven-

tional historical account of secularization is derived from organizing
materials in terms of ideas of historical evolution rooted in retionalistic and Marxist philosophy and from simplifying the complexity of
history through contrasting pairs of concepts such as the magico-religious
and the scientific, the sacred and the secular, and the like (1973:82-83).
In his analysis of the history of Christianity in Western societies,
Martin (1978) maintains that the outcomes of the English war, the American
Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution have created
different patterns of secularization in England, America, France, and
Russia.

Secularization in England is characterized by erosion of religious

ethos and institutional participation; in America by erosion of religious

'

ethos; in France by massive religious beliefs, ethos, and institutions
confronting massive secularist beliefs, ethos, and institutions; and in
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Russia by massive erosion of religious beliefs, ethos, and institutions
(1978: 7-8).
Against the so-called "good old days" fallacy (Greeley, 1969:12),
Greeley cited several historical evidences to prove that there is no
ground for assuming that faith and morals in the middle ages were better
than they ar·e today:
In 1276, for example, the Cardinal Legate Simon de Brion
threatened excommunications to all clerics and students who
mocked at Jesus and Mary during the Mass itself and played
dice on the altar--this presumably in the midst of an "age of
faith." And those who speak of ·'sexual revolution" or of a
"permissive society" should be asked a revolution from what
and permissive in regard to what. One very much doubts morals
are any more lax today than they were in the Versailles of
Louis XIV, the London of the Restoration, or the Regency of
the Salzburg of Archbishop Wulf von Dietrich (1970b:279).
Elsewhere (Greeley, 1969:12-19), he cited anthropologist Geertz and
sociologist LeBras to support the contention that the primitive people
or early Christians were no more religious than modern men or modern
Christians--a practice followed by many critics of secularization thesis
(Brothers, 1973; Jackson, 1974; Towler, 1974, Glasner).
As expected, sociologists employing an exclusive definition of
religion tend to see the history of religion as a history of secularization.
In his discussion of secularization, Wilson, as noted above, is concerned mainly with the significance of religion in social order.

What he

contends is that religion was once socially more significant than it is
today.

Hence, to point out the persistence of private religions in modern

society or the existence of individual irreligious in the past does not
really invalidate his thesis (Wilson, 1969, 1971, 1975, 1976a, 1976b).
Addressing himself to the question whether society and individual used to
be more religious than they are today, Wilson states that
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Religious thinking, religious practices and religious
institutions were once at the centre of the life of western
society, as indeed of all societies . • • •
In the twentieth century that situation has manifestly
changed, and the process of change continues (1969:9-10).
Describing the age of Innocent III, Wilson remarks that
. . • life was effectively regulated, at least in its public
concerns, by the demands of the Church. The Church controlled
not only the moral fabric of society (perhaps that least of
all), but the formal process of political, juridical, commercial, and social intercourse--the institutional operation of
society (1976b:9-10).
Today, he goes on to say that
Not only fewer people believe, but everyone knows that
fewer people believe, and this very knowledge diminishes
the credit of the Church. Despite impressive buildings, and
established place in public life, and the dignity accorded
to Church leaders, it becomes clear to all that the Church
is losing its social significance (1976b:l5).
Berger (1971) takes issue with the critics of secularization who

con~

tend that in the a:bsence of scientific data from the past, we cannot say
with any pretense of science that religiosity in the previous ages was
more intense than it is today (Greeley, 1969:12, 22-23).

He admits that

there are no data on the past religious situation that can be compared with
the data collected by social scientists today; but, he says, if one does
not dismiss scientific rank from the materials gathered by historians, one
is hardly overwhelmed by the argument, because there is a wealth of materials
on the place of religion in Western societies in the past, materials not
only from interpretation of the intellectuals but rather from sources like
memoirs, letters, reports on actual events, legal documents, and the like
that allow a good insight into beliefs and practices of common people of the
time.

He continues:

...

Once such materials are accepted as evidence, one is hardpressed to come to another conclusion than the one that the place
of religion in consciousness and social life has become much
smaller today. One needs only to consider the reports on the
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daily life in the middle ages or, what lies much closer to us,
the reports of Louis de Saint Simon on the life at the court
of Louis XIV--let alone the reports on the daily life and
beliefs of the peasants (1971:57).
Acquaviva (1971:162) divides the history of social transformation
into three phases: the first phase of social history is mainly a religious
history; the second phase is a history of cooperation between society and
religion; and the third phase is a history of desacralization of society.
Speaking of dechristianization, he (1960) maintains that the decline of
religion is mainly due to the coming of the city.

Since the dawn of

humanity, there have been rebels against all forms of religion, or at
least organized religion, although on a lower scale than during the eightteenth and following centuries.

"It was during the two hundred year 1970-

1950 that both the acceleration of urban development and the growth of
irreligion took place (1960:210).
While Parsons insists that the history of the relationship between
Christianity and society has been "the development of the process of the
'Christianizing' of the secular society: (1963: 44), 0 'Dea maintains that
the history of the Western civilization has been the history of "a deChristianization" (1956:67) or, as he often calls it, the secularization of
culture (1956, 1966, 1969).

The history of the secularization of culture

consists, according to O'Dea, of four basic processes: Judaism and Christianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and rise of science.

Judaism

and Christianity "de-divinized the world," the Renaissance "strove for a
religion of affirmation of the world and of the intellect," the Reformation
was "an attempt to find a Christian center gravity in a world of social and
moral integration and national and intellectual innovation," and ''science
attempts to make men "become the masters and possessors of nature (1956:
57).

Each process involves a further phase of desacralization and ration-
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Even without any data to show that the religious condition in the
past was any better, Glock and his co-author Stark believe that the current religious situation in America, especially the widespread doubt about
orthodoxy, represents a "religious revolution" (Stark and Glock, 1968:
205-224).
• we have no certain evidence that fewer theologians a
generation ago doubted traditional Christian doctrines. Nor
can we prove that the forebearers of today's Christians were
less inclined to doubt these doctrines. There is simply no
reliable evidence on the state of faith in past times. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the widespread doubt of traditional Christian tenets is a recent development, that previous
generations have been more prone to traditional convictions
(Stark and Glock, 1968:206).
Such kind of argumentation Greeley characterizes as "naive" (1969:65).
Since we lack systematic, thoroughly documented historical data on
the state of religion in the past, there is simply no way of establishing
with certainty whether there has been a decline of religiosity or not.
Historical material is notoriously difficult to analyze and subject to
many biases.

Out of a wealth of historical data evidences are often

gathered to support conflicting views and certain prenotions without
reporting the existence of data which may serve as counter-evidence.

Too

often, historical data which are just illustrative are selected to prove
sweeping historical generalizations.

The debate on the religiosity of the

past ages is another example of the weakness and vulnerability of most of
the analysis of historical material developed by sociologists.
The New Religions
The outburst of a bewildering array of the so-called "new religions"
in the 1960 has stimulated, as expected, special interest among sociologists

"
of religion concerned with the issue of secularization.

What is the sig-

nificance of these new religious patterns with respect to secularization?
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Is it a counter-secularization movement or a further sign of secularization?
The purpose of this section is to show how the sociologists with different
approaches to the definition of religion evaluate the meaning of this new
phenomenon.
The sociologists adopting an inclusive definition of religion tend to
see in the emergence of the new religions as a search for a new form of
religion.

Speaking of the necessity of formation of new religions to cope

with modern situation, Yinger remarks about the contemporary youth movements that "many elements of contemporary youth movements also seem to
me, despite their nihilistic and anomie qualities, to express a profound
search for sacred ideas and qualities.

They are sensitive to the fact

that new ultimate questions press in on man . . • " (1970:534).
According to Parsons 1 the new }:el::i.~:i,Qus J!lOVement xepre~ent~ a beg;i.n..,.
ning of an "expressive revolution," (1974:222), a harbinger ot' the emergence
of a new type of religion that is in favor of the affective.,..expressive
emphasis relative to the previous cognitive-rationalistic one.

The themes

of love and community in the new religions are seen to be legitimate sociocultural descendents of Christianity (1971;232-234).

Speaking of the

increasing acceptance of the legitimacy of non-western religions, Parsons
makes the following comment:
From one point of view . . . , the new movement may be a
kind of culmination of the trend of secularization we have
traced which has sanctified, by inclusion, and moral upgrading
component after component of what originally was conceived to.
be the world by contrast with the spiritual order (1971;233).
Bellah (1974, 1975, 1976) discerns in the ne~ movement an emergence
of a new religious consciousness, an open, iconoclastic, non-rat~onal,
experimental, and new \vay of g:rasping religious meaning.

It is not a
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counterc ulture, though not totally unrelated to it; "above all, it is a
new way of being religious within modern culture and is not simple rejection of that.

As a form of consciousness, it is not clearly institutional-

ized, although there is more than in the churches than perhaps is realized
(1974:114-115).

Moreover, Bellah interprets the new religious movement as

an indication of "the inability of utilitarian individualism to provide a
meaningful pattern of personal and social existence" (1976:339), and as a
source of visions and ideals that hold promise for a broader cultural transformation which can begin to repair the broken covenant.
Greeley (1969:55-72; 1970a) does not consider the resurgence of the new
religions as a counter-secularization, since there has never been secularization, but as a protest against the hyper-rationalist society, and as a multiplication of new forms of religion.
It is then, in my judgment, inaccurate to assume that
some of the more recent and bizzare manifestations of
religion and the sacred represent a 're-sacralization'.
Society was never really 'de-sacralized' in the first place.
What we are witnessing, I think, is rather the expansion of
Thomas Luckmann's 'marketplace of interpretative schemes'.
New forms of the sacred are becoming available in that
marketplace, though at least some of them are in fact very
old (1970a:204).
Unlike Bellah, Martin (1974, 1976b) regards contemporary youth movement as a counter-culture that struggles against "science, puritanism,
industrial society, and utilitarian ugliness" (1966b:87) and describes it
as "anarchic, morally deviant and experimental, aesthetically exploratory,
mystical" (1976b:88).

Elsewhere

(Martin: 1974), he calls the student

movement from Stockholm to New York "religious without institutionalization
and dogmatic coherence" (1974:569).
Sociologists working with an exclusive definition of religion tend to
stress that the new religious movement is a further demonstration of the
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decline or irrelevance of traditional religions, although they do not deny

it as a search for meaning, community, and the like.
In the Californian youth culture, Berger believes, "the basic
religious sensibility" is "a kind of quasi-mystical, very anti-intellectual
approach to reality" (1977a: 71).

Speaking of the recent upsurge of pre-

occupation with occulticism, Berger states that "The current occult wave
(including its devil component) is to be understood as resulting from the
repression of transcendence in modern consciousnes: (1977b:209) and
characterizes it as "a pronographic provocation • • • against the world
view of modern secularity" (1977b:209) because like eating forbidden fruit,
it provides libidinal pleasure, or more to the point: "modern man doing
magic resembles a Puritan in a whorehouse" (1977b:208).
Like Bellah, Acquaviva (1973a:l8-21) sees in the youth movement the
emergence of new ways of being religious but he believes that this is
because both secular theology and the established Church have failed to
satisfy the religious need of the youth.
Similarly, O'Dea (1969) regards the youth movement as a testimony of
a profound religious crisis, a loss of "a sense of ontologically justified
orientation," and the meaninglessness of the traditional religions.
But malaise, reluctance to assume adult roles, loss of orientation, search for meaning and direction, rebellion against the
adult society, a cult of experience and of the present--all these
testify to the loss of meaning. All these testify that we witness
a spiritual crisis. The incapacity of our spiritual and intellectual leaders to offer meaning to these youth is a further
testimony. The trumpet gives an uncertain sound, when indeed one
can hear it at all (1969:162).
The widespread exploitation and experimentation of alternative
life styles among the youth is, according to Glock (1976) a visible symptom
of a world view clash that has been going on for decades.

Science has
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undermined the traditional religious world view but is unable to provide a
substitute itself; the hectic quest for the alternatives is a desperate
effort to fill the void science has created.
The most outspoken sociologist who insists that the new religions
represent not the dawn of a new religious revolution but a widespread
secularization is Wilson.

New sects, he points out, "are themselves a

feature of societies experiencing secularization, and they may be seen as
a response to a situation in which religious values have lost pre-eminence
(1969:207).

Modern society is organized by rational, impersonal, and

bureaucratic modes of control; as a result, "charismatic leadership
persists only in the interstices between institutional orders, in the
narrow social space that remains for collective behavior, spontaneous
faith, and unconstrained obedience and adultaion" (1975a: 125).

Comment-

ing on the hippies in the United States, Wilson says that "the central
quest is the pleasurable search for the expanded mind, not the anguished
search for objective religious truths" (1970:200).

More recently, Wilson

argued that the present upsurge of the novel religions should be viewed
"as a confirmation of the process of secularization.

They indicate the

extent to which religion has become inconsequential for modern society"
(1976b:96).

Against those who see in the youth movement the persistence of

religion he writes:
The emergence of the new cult movements are not counterforces to secularization nor the likely seed-beds of an
alternative culture. These cults, oversung as evidence of
the persistence of religion by some who should know better
but who today have perhaps no other religious song to sing,
I regard as having a rather different significance. Their
growth, transient appeal, decay, and eventual replacement by
other enthusiasms, appear to me to be evidence of the trials
of the human spirit in a world in which new techniques and
increasingly rational procedures dominate man's social
experience. They tell us that living in secular society is
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painful, and they intimate modern man's permanent condition
of bereavement at the loss of community. But they do not
provide the basis for a new religious culture (1976b:viii).
Elsewhere (1975b) he addresses himself even more directly to the issue of
secularization:
If we concede the abundance of sects and cults, does
this create embarrassment for those who support the
secularization thesis? I hardly think so. These movements
thrive precisely because the culture is secularized: in a
religious society they could scarcely arise, or, if arising,
survive. They are themselves a religious response to the
secularization of society, but they are essentially a
marginal phenomenon (1975b:81~82).
Besides, "secularization," he says, "is the major contemporary transformation of religion against which the cults are likely to be no more than
transient and volatile gestures of defiance? (1976b:ll2).
How one assesses the new religious movements depends very much on his
own ideological predisposition and experiences.

The different evaluations

are, to a large extent, personal speculations and biases.

Bell (1968:476-

488) calls them a cultural vogue of the decade, cultural experience expressed in religious language, and escape from reality in search for fantasy.
These interpretations are equally defendable as any one advanced above.

In

order to find out the significance of the new religious movements, Wuthnow
(1976) examined thirteen new religious groups in San Francisco Bay and came
to the following conclusion:
The future of these movements, judging from the present
data, in uncertain. On the one hand, they have garnered
most of their support from the better educated and more
intellectually aware, If there is something about these
movements that is more compatible with the modern intellectual
climate than traditional religion has been, they may prosper
well into the future, especially as more and more people
become educated. On the other hand, they seem to appeal most
to youn~ people lvho are still at an unsettled stage in their
lives. As these young people mature and become more settled,
they may abandon these groups. Thus, the appeal of these
groups v70uld be limited to new cohorts as similar stages in
their life-cycles (1976:292-293).
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Religious Statistics and Survey Researches
The very concept of secularization implies a long-term phenomenon;
but data on long term religious change are almost non-existent.

Religious

statistics and some survey studies are the only trend data that are available today.

Religious statistics are notoriously subject to many errors

and inadequacies, and the survey data are restricted to too short a
period of time and, in some cases, to too small a population to justify
any meaningful generalizations.

These short comings and many more not-

withstanding, even some of the leading sociologists of religion who are
interested in the issue of secularization have marshalled hard data, often
not even trend data, to endorse their respective positions.

This section is

an attempt to indicate the ways in which these sociologists use church
statistics or survey data to substantiate their views.

Of course, not all

sociologists we have selected are interested in quantitative empirical
documentations.
Some sociologists employing a broad definition of religion consider
church statistics and survey data,being confined to church religion, to
be incapable of measuring religiosity as such.

Luckmann, (1960, 1967)

although not the first to distinguish between religion and churches, is
probably the first sociologist who has brought to attention the severe
limitations of church statistics and most of recent researches in sociology
of religion.

He points out that underlying most, if not all, recent

studies of sociology of religion is the assumption of identification of
church with religion as such.

It is this assumption, coupled with vestiges

of the nineteenth century positivistic view of religion, that accounts for
the current misconception of secularization that characterizes much of
recent sociology of religion: diminution of church religiosity is auto-
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matically identified with the decline of religion as such--an entirely
illegitimate inference.

Luckmann's position has engendered a cohort of

critics of the methodology prevalent among sociologists of religion on
the same ground (Matthes, 1962a, 1962b; Vrijhof, 1969; Swanhorn, 1969;
Gannon, 1972; Brothers, 1973; Glasner, 1976).

Yet, he continues to say that

in the absence of adequate researches on the place of religion as such in
modern society, no one interested in theorizing can afford the luxury to
disregard the abundant materials collected on church religion.

Examining

recent researches from America, France, and Germany, almost none of them
trend data, Luckmann came to the conclusion that church religion has become
a marginal phenomenon in modern society:
Comparing the European and American findings on the social
location of church religion and allowing for the differences in
the character of church religion in European and American
society we are led to the conclusion that traditional church
religion was pushed to the periphery of 'modern' life in Europe
while it became more "modern" in America by undergoing a
process of internal secularization (1967:36-37).
Yinger (1970:32-40) adopted a similar view when he speaks of crosscultural measurements of religious behavior.

The problem of definition,

he says, merges with the problem of measurements.

A serious difficult

associated with virtually all efforts to measure religion is the limitation of the dimensions or scales to a few clearly related religious
traditions.

This puts a limit on any effort to develop generalizations

about the relationships between religion and society that have crosscultural validity.

Furthermore, they measure what religion one has

dropped off, but not what one has picked up.
Most importantly, if one's measurements use a criterion
the degree of acceptance of traditional form of belief and'
practice, one is confronted with a serious problem of distinguishing between religious change and religious decline.
And one is likely to miss completely the more ephemeral,
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the emergent, or the poorly institutionalized expression of
ultimate concern (1970:32).
Speaking of British religious practice, Martin (1967:34-51) shares
Wilson's conclusion that there has been a general tendency of decline in
baptisms, confirmations, and attendance as shown in religious statistics;
but he warns that the interpretation of church statistics should take into
account the widespread religious interest in the audience of radio and
television (on any given Sunday about 24 per cent of the adult population
see BBC religious programs and about 18 per cent lTV religious programs),
and the participation in a multitude of ancillary organizations.

(At

least four persons out of five seem to feel that religion should be
passed on in these various ways to children.)

Furthermore, he suggests

that the constant use of the word "decline" should be set against massive
demographic fluctuations, which often show that the real source of the
decline is other than religious and against the striking resilience of
the church under the accelerating changes that erode traditional institutions of any kind.

He also indicates that the large-scale institutional

abstention of the working class does not necessarily mean that they are
irreligious.

He points out further disaffection from organized religion

in the post-Restoration era, religious indifference as well as heresy in
London, and church absence of the lowest social strata in the seventeenth
century.

Then he concludes:

At any.rate the important and massive fact remains that
with every incentive to spend time in an alternative manner
one quarter of the population is in church at least once a
month. And even if one allows for some tendency to exaggerate attendance on the part of those interrogated, that
exaggeration is in itself significant. . . .
if we expect some mild erosion of the more conventiohal
rites of passage and the special difficulties of non-conformists, the position seems to have been almost stationary since
the war (1967:50-51).
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With regard to beliefs and attitudes, Martin (1967:52-76) indicates
that the figures which suggest the smallness of the orthodox minority
deserve cautious interpretation.

There are many different possible com-

binations of beliefs apart from the orthodox which equally have their
own internal logic: diversity is not necessarily irreligion nor confusion.
One should remember, he points out, that only one person in twenty is an
explicit atheist and some one of ten atheists believes in immortality;
faith in prayer is wide and deep even among the agnostics.

(One person in

three says daily prayers and only one person in four fails to teach prayers
to children; besides, one person in six believes in hell, and as many
believe in ghosts; a broad assent exists to what is perversely believed
to be Christian morality such as do as you would be done by; attitudes
toward religious observance show considerable variation according to the
type of observance; compared with the politicians, the clergy have a
surprisingly good image, and on social matters, the Church is believed to
be losing influence but this is widely deplored, which is in itself
significant.)

To all these must be added the so-called subterranean

theologies and a variety of superstitions such as belief in ghosts (one
in six of the population believes in ghosts and one in fifteen says he
has actually one), and faith in luck and devices (nearly half of the
population has consulted a fortune teller, and four out of five read
weekly horoscopes, though half of these describe it as a diversion).
About the whole situation Martin remarks as follows:
All such examples bear strongly on assumption about
secularization, the impact of the age of science, the
advent of human maturity and so on. They suggest that
far from being secular our culture wobbles between a
~
partially absorbed Christianity, biased towards comfort
and the need for confidence, and beliefs in fate, luck
and moral governance incongruously joined together. If
we add to these layers of folk religiosity the attraction
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of Freudianism and of Marxist mechanics for segments of
the intelligentsia, it is clear that whatever the difficulties of institutional religion they have little connection with any atrophy of the capacity for belief (1967:76).
If Freudianism and Marxism are considered as religions, the concept of

religion is broad indeed.
To endorse his contention that there has been a persistence of
religion rather than secularization, Greeley (1969, 1972a, 1972b) repeatedly
cited a 1965 replication of the 1952 national study, a 1965 research by
NORC on religious behavior of graduate students of the top twelve American
universities, some other statistics and authors.

The 1965 replication

study shows that from 1952 to 1965 there had been almost no change either
in basic doctrinal commitments or in membership and church attendance for
American gentiles.

Proportional

orthodo~~

among the Jews--never as

important for the Jews as for the gentiles, he emphasizes--seemed to be
declining, while at the same time synagogue attendance was going up, as
was affiliation with congregation.

As for the youth, Catholic young

people were more orthodox than their predecessors, and there were some
minor signs of a downward trend among young Protestants, but, he noted,
that "certainly not of such a magnitude as to allow us to believe the newspaper accounts of the vast

apostasy among the young" (1969:39).

To dis-

count the importance of the very notable decline in American Catholics'
willingness to accept the traditional teaching on birth control and
respect for the clergy, Greeley remarks:
thus far in the history of Catholicism in the United
States, the changing attitudes toward the clergy and
changing sexual morality have not affected either the basic
doctrinal loyalty of Catholics or their organizational
involvement. (One can presume that, certain Catholic
'
leaders to the contrary notwithstanding, birth control and
divorce are not at the center of the Catholic doctrinal
system (1972b:l41).
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Incidently, this remark seems to have been substantiated by a recent
replication study of Greeley and associates (Greeley, et al, 1976:28-39).
About these above mentioned findings, Greeley comments that "the data
are admittedly thin.

They do not prove that the secularization

hypothesis is wrong but they certainly call it into considerable question"
(1972b:l41).
The 1965 ongoing NORC study of the religious behavior of the June
1961 college graduates indicated that there was some erosion of church
affiliation among the arts and science graduate students: 95 per cent of
the students had been raised in affiliation with organized religion, but
only 75 per cent still maintained a religious affiliation.

It should be

remembered, Greeley warned, that this loss, though a considerable one for
the organized church, occurred among those young people where presumably
the loss would be most massive and that, even here, the loss constitutes
only a fifth of the population (1969:40-41).

The same study showed that

there was some erosion in weekly church attendance among the Protestant
graduates, but "there was no evidence of a notable secularization of either
the Catholic or Jewish respondents" (1969:42), and there was no major conflict between scholarship and religion.

About these young Americans Greeley

states:
Our data may indicate that, while the crises of faith are
more serious and more frequent than they were in the past,
they are not yet necessarily the beginning of a loss of faith
or departure from organized religion • . .
The secularization hypothesis, therefore, is simply not
substantiated by any of the empirical data available to us;
neither is the hypothesis of grave crisis (1972b:l50).
Speaking of the annual Gallup poll data on church attendance, Greeley

..,

makes the following observation:
For reasons we do not understand, there are cyclical
patterns in religious behavior, with upswings and downswings
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apparently following each other at intervals of five to ten
years. In any event, church attendance in the middle 1960's
is higher than it was in the middle 1930's, and one would be
as ill-advised to argue for a religious revival on the basis
of those statistics as one would be to argue for a religious
decline on the basis of shorter-range statistics (1969:49).
The effect of an inclusive definition of religion in the argument of
secularization is most apparent in the comments Greeley made on the low
institutional participation in European countries.

Although church

membership and affiliation in European countries are less striking than in
the United States, he says, the "basic convictions still seem to persist in
great masses of the population" (1969:51), and "religious of some sort,
however vague, seems to persist despite these problems" (1969:52).

He then

continues:
One may write this off as a residue of the past or as a
persistent superstition, but the important fact to remember
is that the residue persists and so the superstitution, and
persists in large segments of the population (1969:53).
Elsewhere, he makes similar remark:
I am merely arguing from the data
managed to persistin the modern world,
or the other (emphasis mine)? despite
zation and change which are alleged to
great vigor (1972a:l3).

that religion has
in some fashion
forces of secularibe working with

In citing other authors, Greeley seems to be highly selective and
biased.

For instance, he cited Lipset (1962) who, after examining all

available denominational statistics, came to the conclusion that there has
been no dramatic change in the pattern of religious life of Americans, to
support his contention that there is no secularization; but, he failed to
mention another, perhaps, the most detailed and extensive, analysis of
American church statistics made by Demerath (1968) who has reached an
....

opposite conclusion that "traditional religion is increasingly autonomous
but decreasingly relevant" (Demerath, 1968:43).
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Sociologists using an exclusive definition of,religion are inclined
to argue that religious statistics and research data do provide evidence for
the secularization hypothesis.

Thus, Wilson (1969:21-22) maintains that

although church statistics cannot measure the meaning, motivation, and
strength of religion, nor the invisible, unorganized religion, they do
supply some evidence of change in organized religious participation and
churches' influence over ideas and activities of men.
offer some sort of index of secularization.

They can, therefore,

Hence, what Wilson, through

religious statistics, intends to prove in his discussion of secularization
is not whether there is still religion in one form or another, rather the
loss of influence of organized churches.

After examining British church

statistics on membership, attendance, baptisms, confirmations, Eastern
communions, Sunday school enrollments, weddings, and burials, Wilson came
to the following conclusion:
There are two trends which can be discerned. The first is
the diminution in religious practice over the period of sixty
or seventy years in most forms of religious involvement which
amount to more than one isolated ceremonials. The other is the
diminution in religious participation over the life-cycle of
the individual (1969:30).
In an attempt to devaluate the relatively high figures on baptisms, confirmation, wedding, and burial, Wilson states that if set over against the low
figures of other religious participations, the figures cannot be said to
represent religious sentiment but should be seen as just to provide "appropriate ceremonial for prestige and status enhancement at crucial stages of
life cycle" (1969:39), and in many cases, as routine or superstition, which,
for Martin and Greeley, as noted above, would be still considered as
evidence for the persistence of religion.
In addition, Wilson indicated that religious forces exercise now less
influence over people's lives than they did, as manifested in the smaller
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numbers who are involved in church work of one kind or another; in less
time and attention given to religious thought and action; in proportionally less religious publications as compared with secular publications; in
smaller religious control over the means of communication, and so on.

As

for the large audience of TV and radio religious programs, pointed out by
Martin, Wilson remarks that "we cannot be all sure that their level of
attention is the same as that which prevails in church" (1966:25).
To evaluate the whole British religious situation, Wilson say that
although institutionally the organized religion still remains favorably
placed, "there can be no doubt about the

decline in church-going, church-

membership, sustained religious commitment, and the general standing of
the Church in society" (1969:39).
The statistically impressive religious participation in the United
States was discredited by Wilson in a similar fashion in which he commented
on the high figures on the rites of passage in Britain mentioned above.
Adopting the now famous thesis of Herberg (1960), Wilson maitains that
being religious in America is simply being American, having little to do
with religiosity itself .
• . . the American Churches have, in effect, if less explicitly,
subordinated their distinctive religious values to the values of
American society. Thus, though religious practice has increased,
the vacuousness of popular religious ideas has also increased:
the content and meaning of religious commitment has been acculturated (1969:122).
To justify this interpretation, Wilson states that it is a gross fallacy to
interpret statistical figures of different countries in the same way without
taking into account the historical and cultural context in which the statistics exist (1969:118).
Acquaviva is also aware that the experience of the sacred cannot be
directly measured, but he maintains that the statistical figures can be
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treated as indicative, approximate, and suggestive indirect index of the
degree of religiosity (1970:76-81).

As evidence of the vast impoverish-

ment of the sacred, Acquaviva (1971:92-147, 178-199) has collected a
wealth of statistical data from all over the world including communist
countries such as Russia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and even China.

The data

are restricted primarily to Catholicism, ranging from church membership
and attendance through spiritual exercies to divorce and illegitimate
birth rates; from trend data to simple reports.

Some data are the very

data which other sociologists use as evidence for high religiosity such as
the high percentage of citizens in Western societies who still believe in
God.
Having presented these data, Acquaviva, without giving any attention
to the lack of comparative data in the previous ages, simply states:
To conclude, the cifers and reports presented so far
appear to be enough to convince the reader of the fact
that, without doubt, it is difficult not to sustain that
adherence to the ecclesiastical religiosity, and, within
certain limits, to any type of religious belief, even
belief in God is increasingly weakening (1970:114).
Such illegitimate conclusion appears even more puzzling when set against the
great bulk of materials he cited from the French religio-geographic data
and LeBras' (1963:449) insistence that all his work of sociology and
history has been a protest against the idyllic image of Christians in the
middle ages.
Glock discussed the issue of secularization primarily in the context
of the comment he and his associate Stark made on the dispute of the socalled post-war religious revival in America (Glock and Stark, 1965:67-85)
and their analyses of the 1963 Northern Californian regional survey on
religion and anti-semiticism (Stark and Glock, 1968) and the 1958 NORC
study on the graduate students of twenty-five American universities (Glock
and Stark, 1965:261-288).
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In the discussion of the religious revival they questioned the
reliability of the religious statistics: "none of it actually is completely
reliable although it is impossible to judge just exactly how reliable it
is" (Glock and Stark, 1965:76).

They also indicated that the indicators

used are too crude and do not represent all dimensions of religion.
Further, the data on high contributions and investments in church buildings,
they said, may simply reflect the general prosperity and do not necessarily
indicate religious fervor.

Similarly, the increase in religious literature

and commodities may just be a result of commercial fad that "religion was
again in style" (Glock and Stark, 1965:78).

Then they made the following

comment:
Actually, there is nothing in the literature that would
constitute a serious and systematic defense of the secularization hypothesis. Its advocates are likely to be clergymen,
church administrators, theologians, or journalists, and where
they have been social scientists they have tended to be
oriented to qualitative rather than quantitative observation.
The evidence which they cite tends to be neither systematic
nor thoroughly documented. Their view of religion • . • is
likely to be a circumscribed one, though in a different way
from the views of the 'revivalists' (Glock and Stark, 1965:
83).

Nevertheless, after examining the Northern Californian data set
against the data from the national sample provided by NORC in 1964, Glock
and his associate did find some evidence of secularization going on in the
United States.
. . . perhaps the most important finding . . . is that the
overwhelming proportion of Americans today do not adhere to
a pristine orthodoxy. Less than a third overall were
firmly committed to these three beliefs [belief in God, in
the Devil, and in life after death], and only in the small
Protestant sects were as many as half classifiable as highly
orthodox. Indeed, 45 per cent of America's Protestants and
46 per cent of the Roman Catholics fall in the bottom two ·-.
categories of the Orthodox Index. Thus, it is clear that
"Old Time" Christian Orthodoxy in all its certainty is not
the predominant religious perspective of modern America.
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Whether Protestant or Catholic, the average American does not
firmly retify this group of traditional doctrines.
These findings raise the issue of secularization. A
number of recent commentators have claimed that American
religion during the twentieth century has become increasingly
secularized; that the mystical and supernatural elements
of traditional Christianity have been replaced by an
increasingly skeptical and demythologized religious outlook.
These data suggest that this has indeed occurred. While it
is true that we have no comparable information on the
religious beliefs of nineteenth century Americans, there seem
compelling historical grounds for suggesting that the average
mid-nineteenth century American Christian would have scored
high on our Orthodoxy Index. If this assumption is warranted
then it is clear that substantial changes have in fact taken
place (Stark and Glock, 1968:63).
As noted above, it is exactly this assumption that has been challenged by
many sociologists, notably Greeley (1969, 1972a, 1972b).
While Greeley (1969, 1972b) did not find any major conflict betltleen
science and scholarship in the 1965 study on graduate students of the

top

twelve American universities, Glock and his colleague (Glock and Stark,
1965:262-288) did find the deteriorating impact of science on religion in
the 1958 study on the graduate students of twenty-five American universities.
Among others, they found that religious affiliation and attendance at worship
increases sharply as exposure to scientific scholarship decreases, and that
scholarly ethos was negatively related to religious affiliation and attendance (1965:279, 284).

To

the question whether lack of religious affilia-

tion means also lack of religious faith, Glock and his colleague replied
that public opinion polls suggest that
when an Awerican says he has n9 ~eligion he means he
not only has no formal church affiliation~ but that he also
~ejects' religiqus faith.
Hence, while we haye no data on
the religious b.eliefs of these gradua,te students, there
see~ so~e basis ~or interpreting their reports o~ no
religious preference as ~plying a rejection of religious
belief (Gl~ck and Stark, 1965:210).
.
~
Such interpretation would be unimaginable for Yinger who insists that people
should be asked not only what religion they have left but also what
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religion they have gone to, as indicated above.
Whether the secularization hypothesis is born out by empirical data
depends very much on the choice of data or the mode of interpreting data
which in turn hinges on the definition of religion.

While most of the

sociologists prefering an inclusive definition of religion tend to
question no longer primarily the reliability of the data but the very
validity of the data as indices of religiosity.

Sociologists

choo$~ng

an

exclusive definition tend to argue that the existing data do provide at
least some evidence for the hypothesis of secularization.

Both groups are

inclined to exaggerate and stretch the meaning and significance of the data
in favor of their respective views, despite the appearance of scientific
objectivity.
Summary
The objective of this chapter has been to indicate how sociologists
adopting different kinds of definitions of religion use and intepret
empirical data to endorse their different positions.

It has been pointed

out that sociologists committed to an inclusive definition tend to regard
the history of religion as a history of religious change, variously seen
as

adaptation, evolution, transformation, or institutionalization of

religious values in society.

Even when the history of Christianity in the

West is viewed as a history of religious decline, it is not considered as
a unitary and irreversible process of decline.

Its nihilistic elements

notwithstanding, the recent youth movement is seen mostly as a sign of
religious vitality, variously interpreted as the search for new answers
to existential problems, the dawn of a new religious revolution, the
~

emergence of a new religious consciousness, or as the protext against an
over-rationalized society and the like.

Refusing to accept church
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statistics and most recent research data as adequate indices of religiosity
in general, these sociologists have the tendency to minimize the significance of church statistics and research materials by emphasizing the
ubiquity of private and personal religions or by adducing only those data
that favor their positions.

On the other hand, those sociologists devoted

to an exclusive definition tend to interpret the history of religion as
a history of religious decline understood as desacralization, secularization of culture, diminution of influence both in social life and individual
consciousness, or deviation from orthodoxy.

They are inclined to see the

outburst of the new religions more as an evidence for the insignificance
of traditional religions than as an indication of a renewed religious
vitality.

Though fully aware of the inadequacies ofreligious statistics

and research materials as indices of religiosity as such, they do use
them as some proof for the hypothesis of secularization.

Unlike their

inclusivist counterparts, these sociologists tend to minimize the importance of private religions, but like them, they, too, tend to overlook
data that disfavor their views.
It appears that precisely in the collecting and interpreting empirical
materials, which are supposed to be strictly scientific activities, one can
see more clearly how easily scientists, despite their avowed objectivity
and neutrality, become victims of personal value, bias, and even temperament and select only those data that can serve to support their preconceived interpretative schemes.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis has been to point out the discrepancies
of the leading contemporary sociological views on the issue of secularization by showing how the different definitions of religion proposed by a
group of representative contemporary sociologists of religion have affected
their understanding of the concept, cause, and future direction of secularization.

I have shown that when religion is defined in generic terms, none

of these sociologists is willing to accept the concept of secularization,
if it implies a notion of anihevitabledemise of religion.

But, when

religion is understood as a specific form of religion, all of these
sociologists, each in his fashion, have developed some concept of secularization.
Further, I have indicated that sociologists who adopt an inclusive
definition of religion are inclined to maintain that religion changes but
never declines (let alone dies) and hence the concept of secularization is
inconceivable.

Consequently, for these sociologists, no factor can be

considered as a cause of secularization, and to talk about the future
course of secularization is meaningless.

On·the other hand, those sociolo-

gists who prefer an exclusive definition are likely to hold that religion
does decline, if not dies, and to regard many factors, especially science
and social differentiation to be causes of secularization.

While some of

them tend to predict the continuation of the process of secularization in
the future, others are more willing to grant the possibility of a reversal
of the process.
As to the empirical evidence, although all these sociologists are
fully aware of the lack of adequate and reliable data about present and
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past religious situations, they all seek to substantiate their respective
positions through some historical, statistical, or survey materials.
Sociologists who employ an inclusive definition of religion are prone to
see the history of religion as a history of religious change, to consider
church statistics as well as the existing survey instruments to be invalid
to measure religiosity as such, and to interpret the current new religious
movement as a sign of the persistence of religion.

They tend to emphasize

the existence of the invisible religions such as magic, superstitions, and
so on, and are skeptical of the assumed high religiosity of the past.

But,

those sociologists who work with an exclusive definition are more likely to
regard the history of religion as a history of religious decline, to consider religious statistics and survey data as, at least, some indices of
secularization, and to view the upsurge of the new religions as a symptom
of religious crisis and irrelevance of existing religions in modern society.
They tend to ignore the so-called subterranean religions and assume, often
uncritically, that people in the past were more religious than they are
today.

Both groups tend to adduce survey findings and religious statistics

that support their views, ignoring those opposing their positionst
All in all, if the concept of secularization is taken as a notion
that suggests an irreversible process of religious demise, none of these
leading contemporary sociologists of religion can be said to be an advocate of secularization; if, however, it is understood as the decline or
demise of a particular religious institution, all of these sociologists
may be called the exponents of secularization.

Further, if secularization

is defined as the decline of religion tout court, those who use an exclusive
~

definition of religion would be considered the advocates of secularization
but not those who opt for an inclusive one.

Hence, none of these leading
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sociologists of religion can be treated as an advocate of secularization
without qualification.
rfuether definitions of religion should be a matter of individual
preference or not, it has surely been shown that they have been such and
that they have a fundamental impact on the outcome of the discussion of
secularization.

Since each definition of religion--by implication, each

view on the issue of secularization--represents an ideological stance, to
call any other perspective on secularization an ideology, a dogma, a myth
or the like only shows its own ideological position.

Thus, as long as the

problem of definition is not solved, the divergences of opinion on the
issue of secularization are bound to remain.
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